Water-related diseases continue to cause a high burden of mortality and morbidity in the countries of the European Region. Parties to the Protocol on Water and Health are committed to the sustainable use of water resources, the provision of safe drinking water and adequate sanitation to all people of the European Region, and to the reduction of the burden of water-related diseases. A specialized Task Force is implementing a work plan aimed at strengthening the capacity for water-related disease surveillance, outbreak detection and contingency planning. Parties to the Protocol are obliged to set targets, and report on progress on water-related disease surveillance. The present paper aims to provide a baseline assessment of national capacities for water-related disease surveillance on the basis of the replies to a questionnaire. This was prepared in English and Russian and administered to 53 countries, 15 of which replied. The results confirm the heterogeneity in surveillance systems, the weakness of many countries to adequately survey emerging water-related diseases, and the need for specific remedial action. The findings of the exercise will form the basis for future action under the Protocol on Water and Health.
INTRODUCTION
Water-related diseases (WRDs) contribute heavily to the burden of communicable diseases and mean any significant adverse effects on human health, such as death, disability, illness or disorders, caused directly or indirectly by the condition, or changes in the quantity or quality, of any waters.
They are particularly important in developing countries, where diarrhoeal diseases kill an estimated 1.8 million people each year (WHO ). In these countries, diarrhoea accounts for 17% of all deaths among children under five years old (United Nations ). An estimated 94% of the burden of diarrhoeal disease is attributable to the environment, and associated with risk factors such as unsafe drinking water, lack of sanitation and poor hygiene The more developed countries of the European Union are not exempt from WRDs (WHO/UNECE ; ECDPC ), especially with regard to emerging pathogens and the emerging issue of small-scale and community-operated water supply and sanitation systems, even if the disease incidence is lower. Emerging pathogens comprise different groups of newly detected micro-organisms (e.g. for water-related pathogens: Cryptosporidium parvum, Legionella pneumophila) or pathogenic mutants (e.g. Vibrio cholerae O139). They include also micro-organisms causing new human-pathogenic conditions (Campylobacter spp.), those identified to be the cause of a well-known infectious disease (hepatitis E virus), or for which the association with a wellknown malignant or degenerative disease has been newly detected (Helicobacter pylori). Human diseases caused by emerging pathogens are associated with the growing number of people with reduced immuno-competence, age (demographic transition), drugs and medical treatment, and new and complex technical applications of water, e.g. dental units, air conditioning, cooling towers, spas, etc. (WHO ). Populations living in rural areas are subject to a higher risk of some infectious diseases than other citizens. Higher fragility of these areas is due to the diffuse environmental contamination of faecal material coming from domestic and wild animals, poor sanitation management, use of groundwater for drinking, often without disinfection, inadequacy of water quality control and lack of community awareness of the potential risks. Some studies have indeed demonstrated a higher incidence of communicable diseases in these areas than in urban ones (Solecki et al. ; Lake et al.
; Norval et al. ).
WRD include all the pathologies caused by the diverse risk factors occurring in water which can be directly (e.g. drinking and bathing waters) and indirectly (e.g. consumption of aquatic organisms and crops) transmitted.
They are often not easy to recognize; it is particularly difficult to distinguish them from foodborne diseases, especially those of the faecal-oral route. These latter can be also transmitted due to contamination of hands, utensils and clothing, especially when domestic sanitation and hygiene are poor. Yet, identifying water as the source responsible for the transmission of disease is strongly encouraged in order to minimize possible spreading of the outbreak and to promote management measures aimed at preventing future dangerous exposure. The real burden of WRDs is underestimated for at least two reasons. First, surveillance systems for their detection are typically inefficient in countries at all levels of socioeconomic development (Poullis et al. ; WHO ); second, when the disease is not severe enough, people do not seek medical attention at all. Yet, failure to detect cases or outbreaks of WRDs is not a guarantee that they do not occur.
Hence, reducing the burden of these diseases is a priority public health goal which can be reached by promoting suitable preventive measures to ensure adequate quality and quantity of water, for example by using the approach of the WHO Water Safety Plans (WHO ) and surveying the health status of communities.
A dedicated surveillance system tailored on WRDs would provide a relevant added value, as they:
• identify outbreaks or incidents of water-related disease or significant threats;
• give prompt and clear notification to public authorities; • define/estimate the burden of WRDs;
• use data and information to identify communities and critical situations where there are problems with WRDs;
• promote intervention measures to control and prevent WRDs;
• target resources toward critical areas with priority needs;
• assess the effectiveness of the implemented water and sanitation interventions in reducing diseases.
WRD surveillance systems can be especially useful in countries with limited resources, where interventions should be designed to be feasible, effective and economical.
For example:
• information on the incidence of typhoid fever may indicate the need for targeted vaccine campaigns in specific geographic locations;
• information on epidemic and endemic giardiasis and cryptosporidiosis in communities that use surface waters supplies may indicate the need for water filtration processes because chlorination is not very effective against these pathogens;
• information on outbreaks of a waterborne disease in adequately treated piped water supplies may indicate intrusion problems in the water distribution system and the need for booster chlorination systems in the distribution system or additional water treatment on a household level;
• information showing a high prevalence of helminth infections may suggest the need for improvements in sanitation and increased availability of water for hand washing.
The goals of a WRD surveillance system should be linked to specific and achievable public health objectives such as eliminating waterborne typhoid fever or reducing the incidence of paediatric gastroenteritis. Surveillance systems should be designed to provide reliable data that are relevant to the waterborne diseases of the region. One of the first activity of the Task force was to prepare a questionnaire aimed at assessing the current capacity for WRD surveillance in Parties and non Parties of the European Region, in order to draw a baseline and identify the main gaps to be filled up for an effective improvement. This paper presents and discusses the main results of this activity.
METHODOLOGY
The questionnaire was structured into the following thematic sections: general aspects, structure-coordination and reporting, case confirmation ability, capacity of response, outbreak detection, laboratory capability, epidemic preparedness, data characteristics, training, and database and mapping and public information. More specifically, the following emerging WRDs are not surveyed:
• campylobacteriosis in two countries (in EUR-A and EUR-C);
• cryptosporidiosis in six countries (four in EUR-A, one in EUR-B and one in EUR-C);
• giardiasis in four countries (two in EUR-A, one in EUR-B and one in EUR-C);
• legionellosis in one EUR-C.
Locally important WRDs, as expected, are controlled in countries where they are relevant (especially because either of the endemicity of the diseases or their occurrence at high levels in natural waters used for drinking):
• methaemoglobinaemia in two countries of EUR-B and EUR-C (in another country of this latter sub-region this surveillance is in preparation);
• arsenicosis in one EUR-B country;
• viral infections, particularly norovirus, in seven countries (three from EUR-A, one from EUR-B and three from EUR-C);
• parasitic diseases in three EUR-A, two EUR-B and three EUR-C countries (their surveillance is in preparation in another EUR-C country).
Structure, coordination and reporting
All the countries have dedicated, mandatory WRD surveillance systems, with the exceptions of two EUR-A countries. All the countries but one (from EUR-A), have a coordinating body at national level that elaborates standardized surveillance notification forms to gather communicable disease surveillance data, but five countries (three from EUR-A, one from EUR-B and one from EUR-C) do not have specific mandatory reporting forms for WRDs.
In addition, these notification forms do not include the possible vehicle of infection (water, foods, etc.).
In one country from EUR-A and another of EUR-C, the notification form for emerging diseases does not require the identification of the environmental sources of the transmission of the disease. 
Case confirmation ability
Case confirmation by laboratory analysis is mandatory in several countries, with the following exceptions: two EUR-A countries for any WRDs; one country in EUR-C for Shigella; one country in EUR-A for Cryptosporidium and Giardia; one country in the EUR-B region for Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Giardia and Legionella.
In general a national laboratory capability to confirm the etiological agents does exist with the following exceptions: one country in EUR-C for any WRDs; one country in EUR-A for cholera, enterohaemorrhagic E. coli, shigellosis, typhoid fever and all emerging WRDs; one country in EUR-B for hepatitis A and all emerging pathogens; another country from EUR-B has laboratory capability only for legionellosis. 
Data characteristics
Case information (age, sex and occupation) is requested in the notification form:
• fully in five countries (four from EUR-A, and one from EUR-B and EUR-C);
• almost completely in four countries (two from EUR-A, one from EUR-B and one from EUR-C);
• lower or much lower in other four countries (one each from EUR-A and EUR-B and two from EUR-C).
Location information (district, region, municipality, travel-related) is requested in the notification form:
• fully in three countries (one per sub-region);
• partially in other countries;
• not at all in one country of EUR-A.
Other information (outbreaks, time, sentinel) is requested in the notification form:
• fully in one country from EUR-C; • partially in other countries.
Basic statistics and trend analysis are performed by many countries but not in two (one from EUR-A and one from EUR-B).
Generally all the countries have established action threshold for WRDs.
• For some severe diseases like cholera and typhoid fever the threshold is generally one case.
• In some countries the threshold is two cases.
• The highest reported threshold is 10 in the case of hepatitis A in a country from EUR-C.
Outbreak detection
Drinking water as the exposure route of priority WRD pathogens is generally identified in centralized water supply systems. This source of exposure is not investigated: in three countries from EUR-A and one from EUR-B; in two countries from EUR-B and two from EUR-C when cases of viral hepatitis A occur. Two countries from EUR-B and EUR-C do not identify the exposure route for any emerging WRDs.
In small-scale community, private and unregulated water supply systems, exposure routes are identified as follows:
Priority diseases: drinking water as exposure route is identified:
• in one country from EUR-A and one from EUR-B for all priority WRDs;
• in seven countries (one from EUR-A, two from EUR-B and four from EUR-C) partially;
• in two countries (one from EUR-A and one from EUR-B) not at all.
Emerging diseases: this exposure route is identified:
• fully in two countries (one from EUR-A and one from EUR-B);
• partially in some other countries;
• not at all in five countries (three from EUR-A, one from
EUR-B region and one from EUR-C).
Food products from aquaculture (shellfish, clams, mussels) when suspected as possible cause of WRDs are investigated:
• fully in three countries (two from EUR-A and one from EUR-C);
• sometimes in two countries (one from EUR-B and one from EUR-C);
• not at all in four countries (two from EUR-A, one from
EUR-B and EUR-C).
Irrigated agriculture products are investigated:
• fully in two countries (one from EUR-B and EUR-C);
• occasionally in four countries (one from EUR-A, two from EUR-B and one from EUR-C);
• not at all in five countries (two from EUR-A and EUR-B and one from EUR-C).
Recreational water is identified:
• fully in two of EUR-A and one of EUR-B;
• almost completely in other two countries of EUR-C, with the exception of hepatitis A;
• not at all in four countries (three from EUR-A and one from EUR-B);
• occasionally in four countries (two from EUR-B and two from EUR-C).
Epidemic preparedness
Epidemic preparedness and response plans for outbreak of WRD are not available at all in six countries (three from EUR-A, one from EUR-B and two from EUR-C regions); three countries (two from EUR-B and one from EUR-C region) elaborate these plans for priority WRDs.
Emergency supplies of drugs were available during 2009:
• in seven countries (two from EUR-A, four from EUR-B and one from EUR-C region);
• partially in one country from EUR-A (to treat giardiasis and legionellosis);
• not at all in one country from EUR-A and one from EUR-C for hepatitis A.
Emergency supplies of vaccines were available during

2009:
• in three countries from EUR-A and one from EUR-C to prevent hepatitis A;
• in one country from EUR-A and one from EUR-C to prevent typhoid fever;
• not at all for any infection in one country from EUR-A, two countries from EUR-B and one from EUR-C.
Emergency medical supplies were available during 2009:
• not at all in one country from EUR A, one from EUR-B and two from the EUR-C region;
• partially in one country from EUR-A for treating viral hepatitis A.
Emergency water treatment supplies were available during 2009:
• not at all in two countries from EUR-A, one from EUR-B and one from EUR-C (excluding cholera);
• partially in one country from EUR-C (not available for emerging pathogens).
Information related to emergency outbreaks is not adequately provided to the public, in five countries (three from the EUR-A and two from the EUR-C region). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We are aware that this paper is based on the replies to the questionnaire from a relatively small number of countries.
Moreover, these replies have some important limits. Physicians with the task to notify WRD cases and outbreaks should be aware of these diseases. For this purpose, in setting up or improving the surveillance systems, they should be trained or at least informed with specific documentation.
The surveillance system in every country should include the surveillance of WRDs at least in critical areas, that are those where WRD outbreaks occur or where WRD is endemic. Moreover, for drinking waters these areas may correspond to areas:
• where supplies are constituted by surface waters;
• with occurrence of livestock farming close to the drinking water supplies;
• subject to droughts where drops of pressure in the water distribution system may favour intrusion of organic materials;
• when supplies are from lakes affected by cyanobacterial
• with small-scale water supplies;
• in industrial areas.
For aquatic organisms and especially mussels critical areas are:
• coastal waters close to towns, industrial areas, livestock farming or affected by the occurrence of marine algae capable of producing algal toxins (FAO );
• internal waters close to towns, industrial areas, livestock farming or affected by the occurrence of cyanobacterial blooms (fish, shrimps). 
).
Finally, the surveillance systems on WRDs should focus on certain periods of the years because of the seasonality of the diseases. The incidence of communicable diseases is higher in specific seasons or times as well as the cyanobacterial and algal densities.
In conclusion, WRD surveillance systems should be at least be set up in the above mentioned areas and activities should be intensified at the most critical times.
To this end, an outbreak management team (OMT) should be set up at the local health unit, headed by a public health officer reporting to the local director of public health. The OMT should be composed of representatives of the waterworks and sanitation system, the water department of the regional environmental agency, and an expert in hygiene and environmental medicine. This group should integrate skills and knowledge otherwise fragmented. They should promote all the initiatives needed to protect the health of the population.
In case of a WRD outbreak, the local OMT should:
• review the evidence for an outbreak;
• identify the population at risk;
• decide on control measures;
• provide quick and adequate information to the public;
• make arrangements for the commitment of personnel and resources.
A clear way forward is to link routine health surveillance data with data on the quality and distribution of water supplies in the same area. There have been a number of examples on how this can work in practice.
Examples include:
• the use of GIS to map the distribution of cases of illness in relation to the geographical boundaries of different water systems to determine whether illness rates are greater in people drinking from one water source compared to others;
• time-series analysis where reports of illness are linked to data from routine water quality measurements to determine whether illness rates increase after deterioration in water quality results;
• prospective studies and enhanced surveillance in areas known to have poorer quality of drinking water.
Finally, the OMT should apply principles and measures of the WHO water safety protocol (WSP) in order to ensure a safe access to water and its resources. The key steps of the WSPs are:
• assemble the team to prepare the WSP;
• document and describe the water supply area;
• undertake a hazard assessment and risk characterization to identify how hazards can enter into the water supply;
• assess the existing or proposed system, including a description of the system and a flow diagram;
• identify control measures to reduce and control the risks;
• define how control measures are to be monitored to ensure acceptable performance of the WSP;
• establish procedures to verify that the WSP is working effectively and will meet the health-based targets;
• develop supporting programmes as well as training, hygiene practices, standard operating procedures, upgrading and improvement, and research and development;
• prepare management procedures, including corrective actions, for normal and incident conditions;
• establish documentation and communication procedures; these can have a large impact on the efficacy of certain removal processes;
• review periodically each WSP.
In conclusion, in our view, the surveillance systems on communicable diseases should include the specific aspects 
